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"Personal Influence": Social Context and Political Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Galeotti
  • Andrea Mattozzi

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of social learning on political outcomes in a model of informative campaign advertising. Voters' communication network affects parties' incentives to disclose political information, voters' learning about candidates running for office, and polarization of the electoral outcome. In richer communication networks, parties disclose less political information and voters are more likely to possess erroneous beliefs about the characteristics of the candidates. In turn, a richer communication network among voters may lead to political polarization. These results are reinforced when interpersonal communication occurs more frequently among ideologically homogeneous individuals and parties can target political advertising.(JEL D72, D85, M37, Z13)

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Galeotti & Andrea Mattozzi, 2011. ""Personal Influence": Social Context and Political Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 307-327, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:1:p:307-27
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.1.307
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    2. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Monica Anna Giovanniello, 2017. "Echo Chambers: Voter-to-Voter Communication and Political Competition," 2017 Papers pgi364, Job Market Papers.
    2. Amit Gandhi & Daniela Iorio & Carly Urban, 2016. "Negative Advertising and Political Competition," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 433-477.
    3. Jing Cai & Alain De Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2015. "Social Networks and the Decision to Insure," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 81-108, April.
    4. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín & Christian Schultz, 2012. "Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative Abstract: The paper considers public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties? candidates and ," EPRU Working Paper Series 2012-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    5. Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked politics: political cycles and instability under social influences," MPRA Paper 65641, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Bogaçhan Çelen & Kyle Hyndman, 2012. "Social Learning Through Endogenous Information Acquisition: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(8), pages 1525-1548, August.
    7. Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked Politics: Political Cycles and Instability under Social Influences," MPRA Paper 65598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    9. Carlos Lever Guzmán, 2010. "Strategic Spending in Voting Competitions with Social Networks," Working Papers 2010-16, Banco de México.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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