IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v14y2022i4p58-77.html

The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games

Author

Listed:
  • Riccardo Ghidoni
  • Sigrid Suetens

Abstract

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequential play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooperation rate by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or very high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or very high in both settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Riccardo Ghidoni & Sigrid Suetens, 2022. "The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 58-77, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:58-77
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200268
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20200268
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3886/E127781V1
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20200268.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20200268.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/mic.20200268?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. Friedman, 1973. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(3), pages 435-435.
    2. Quan Wen, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Felix Kölle & Simone Quercia & Egon Tripodi, 2023. "Social Preferences under the Shadow of the Future," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 406, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    2. Degan, Arianna & Li, Yushen & Xie, Huan, 2025. "Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 94-112.
    3. Ala Avoyan & Daniela Valdivia, 2025. "Strategic Uncertainty and Sequential Play," CESifo Working Paper Series 12198, CESifo.
    4. Martínez-Martínez, Ismael & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2025. "Cooperation in multiplayer dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    5. Camera, Gabriele & Gioffré, Alessandro, 2025. "Cooperation in temporary partnerships," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    6. Marta Boczoń & Emanuel Vespa & Taylor Weidman & Alistair J Wilson, 2025. "Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 784-814.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ghidoni, Riccardo & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games," Other publications TiSEM ff3a441f-e196-4e45-ba59-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Jiawei Li & Graham Kendall, 2015. "On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(8), pages 1-9, August.
    3. George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2017. "When And How The Punishment Must Fit The Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 315-330, May.
    4. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
    5. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2006. "Federal tax autonomy and the limits of cooperation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 317-329, March.
    6. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
    7. Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers ecpap-96-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    8. Rees, Ray, 1993. "Collusive Equilibrium in the Great Salt Duopoly," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 833-848, July.
    9. Kawakami, Toshikazu & Yoshihiro, Yoshida, 1997. "Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 175-178, February.
    10. Germán Coloma, 2002. "Un Modelo Integrado de Depredación y Colusión," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 39(116), pages 123-133.
    11. Gintis, Herbert, 2004. "Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 695-714, December.
    12. Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 181-191, November.
    13. A Banerji & J.V. Meenakshi, 2010. "Competition and Collusion in Grain Markets: Basmati Auctions in North India," Working Papers id:2701, eSocialSciences.
    14. Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
    15. Hasker, Kevin, 2000. "Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games," Working Papers 2000-10, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    16. Hogendorn Christian, 2007. "Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment: The Role of Capacity Exchanges," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, July.
    17. Wu, WenTing & Chen, XiaoQian & Zvarych, Roman & Huang, WeiLun, 2024. "The Stackelberg duel between Central Bank Digital Currencies and private payment titans in China," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    18. Sylwester Bejger, 2019. "Wholesale fuel price adjustment in Poland: examination of competi-tive performance," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 18(4), pages 385-412, December.
    19. Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo M. Zeidan, 2011. "Tacit Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in the Canadian Manufacturing Industry: An Empirical Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 3623, CESifo.
    20. Dijkstra, Peter T., 2014. "Price Leadership and Unequal Market Sharing," Research Report 14013-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:58-77. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.