IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec/v23y2025i2p784-814..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games

Author

Listed:
  • Marta Boczoń
  • Emanuel Vespa
  • Taylor Weidman
  • Alistair J Wilson

Abstract

In repeated games, where both collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, it is crucial to understand the likelihood of selection for each type of equilibrium. Controlled experiments have empirically validated a selection criterion for the two-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma: the basin of attraction for always defect. This prediction device uses the game primitives to measure the set of beliefs for which an agent would prefer to unconditionally defect rather than attempt conditional cooperation. This belief measure reflects strategic uncertainty over others’ actions, where the prediction is for non-cooperative outcomes when the basin measure is full, and cooperative outcomes when empty. We expand this selection notion to multi-player social dilemmas and experimentally test the predictions, manipulating both the total number of players and the payoff tensions. Our results affirm the model as a tool for predicting long-term cooperation while also speaking to some limitations when dealing with first-time encounters.

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Boczoń & Emanuel Vespa & Taylor Weidman & Alistair J Wilson, 2025. "Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 784-814.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:23:y:2025:i:2:p:784-814.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvae042
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2022. "Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264072, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:23:y:2025:i:2:p:784-814.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jeea .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.