IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v10y2018i2p225-49.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dynamic Noisy Signaling

Author

Listed:
  • Sander Heinsalu

Abstract

This article studies costly signaling. The signaling effort is chosen in multiple periods and observed with noise. The signaler benefits from the belief of the market, not directly from the effort or the signal. Optimal signaling behavior in time-varying environments trades off effort-smoothing and influencing belief exactly when it yields a return. If the return to signaling first increases over time and then decreases, then the optimal effort rises slowly, reaches its maximum before the return does, and declines quickly. Advertising data displays this pattern.

Suggested Citation

  • Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Dynamic Noisy Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 225-249, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:10:y:2018:i:2:p:225-49
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160336
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20160336
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=A1pITA1HkHSWeVzYArSlHy4bn8ndvXHe
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=biU4ZQrLtzUEw_Me_3La87f0UdsolMsK
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=bQkyLS5h5Yo9x32l-1Kd6e4t6mEdpLN2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alejandro Badel & Mark Huggett, 2014. "Interpreting Life Cycle Inequality Patterns as an Efficient Allocation: Mission Impossible?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(4), pages 613-629, October.
    2. Mc Lennan, Andrew & Monteiro, P. K. & Tourky, Rabee, 2014. "On uniqueness of equilibrium in the Kyle Model," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 761, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    3. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalo Cisternas & Aaron Kolb, 2020. "Signaling with Private Monitoring," Papers 2007.15514, arXiv.org.
    2. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
    3. Starkov, Egor, 2023. "Only time will tell: Credible dynamic signaling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    4. Ishida, Junichiro & Suen, Wing, 2024. "Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 449-459.
    5. Søren Johansen & Anders Ryghn Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," CREATES Research Papers 2021-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christiane Goodfellow & Dirk Schiereck & Steffen Wippler, 2013. "Are behavioural finance equity funds a superior investment? A note on fund performance and market efficiency," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 14(2), pages 111-119, April.
    2. Daher, Wassim & Karam, Fida & Ahmed, Naveed, 2023. "Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game," MPRA Paper 118138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Berentsen, Aleksander & Huber, Samuel & Marchesiani, Alessandro, 2016. "The societal benefit of a financial transaction tax," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 303-323.
    4. Gianbiagio Curato & Jim Gatheral & Fabrizio Lillo, 2014. "Optimal execution with nonlinear transient market impact," Papers 1412.4839, arXiv.org.
    5. Grout, Paul A. & Zalewska, Anna, 2012. "The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 12-15.
    6. Schnitzlein, Charles & Chelley-Steeley, Patricia & Steeley, James M, 2024. "Conflicting versus reinforcing private information, information aggregation, and the time series properties of asset prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    7. Pichler, Anton & Poledna, Sebastian & Thurner, Stefan, 2021. "Systemic risk-efficient asset allocations: Minimization of systemic risk as a network optimization problem," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    8. Rime, Dagfinn & Sarno, Lucio & Sojli, Elvira, 2010. "Exchange rate forecasting, order flow and macroeconomic information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 72-88, January.
    9. Johannes A. Skjeltorp & Bernt Arne Ødegaard, 2009. "The information content of market liquidity: An empirical analysis of liquidity at the Oslo Stock Exchange?," Working Paper 2009/26, Norges Bank.
    10. Lones Smith, 2000. "Private Information and Trade Timing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1012-1018, September.
    11. Sun, Yuxin & Ibikunle, Gbenga, 2017. "Informed trading and the price impact of block trades: A high frequency trading analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 114-129.
    12. Krishnamurti, Chandrasekhar & Pensiero, Domenico & Velayutham, Eswaran, 2021. "Corruption risk and stock market effects: Evidence from the defence industry," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    13. Yue Zhao & Difang Wan, 2018. "Institutional high frequency trading and price discovery: Evidence from an emerging commodity futures market," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(2), pages 243-270, February.
    14. Chang, Sanders S. & Wang, F. Albert, 2015. "Adverse selection and the presence of informed trading," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 19-33.
    15. Gur Huberman & Dominika Halka, 2001. "Systematic Liquidity," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 24(2), pages 161-178, June.
    16. Liu, Hong & Qi, Lina & Li, Zaili, 2019. "Insider trading, representativeness heuristic insider, and market regulation," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 48-64.
    17. Rasmus Fatum & Jesper Pedersen & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2010. "Are the Intraday Effects of Central Bank Intervention on Exchange Rate Spreads Asymmetric and State Dependent?," Discussion Papers 10-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    18. Medrano, Luis Angel & Vives, Xavier, 2001. "Strategic Behavior and Price Discovery," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 221-248, Summer.
    19. Xianfeng Jiang & Yongdong Shi, 2006. "The Impact of Insider Trading on the Secondary Market with Order-Driven System," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 7(1), pages 129-143, May.
    20. Guillermo Llorente & Jiang Wang, 2020. "Trading and information in futures markets," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(8), pages 1231-1263, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:10:y:2018:i:2:p:225-49. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.