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Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection

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  • Pavel Ševcík

Abstract

This paper studies the joint dynamics of investor protection and economic development in a political economy model with capital accumulation and occupational choice. Less investor protection implies higher costs of external financing for entrepreneurs. This excludes poorer agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. The main determinants of investor protection policy preferences are the agent's net worth and the expected return from entrepreneurship. When the policy is chosen by the simple majority rule, the model generates several implications consistent with the observed variation of investor protection over time and across countries. (JEL D72, E22, E32, G18, G38, J24, L26)

Suggested Citation

  • Pavel Ševcík, 2012. "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 163-197, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:4:y:2012:i:4:p:163-97
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.4.163
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Caroline Fohlin, 2005. "The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 223-282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ramin Dadasov & Philipp Harms & Oliver Lorz, 2013. "Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-22, February.
    2. Mukherjee, Rahul, 2015. "Institutions, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 338-359.
    3. Cesar Tamayo, 2015. "Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 547-577, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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    1. Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection (AEJ:MA 2012) in ReplicationWiki

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