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Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency: Evidence from US Nuclear Power

Author

Listed:
  • Lucas W. Davis
  • Catherine Wolfram

Abstract

Beginning in the late 1990s, electricity markets in many US states were deregulated, and almost half of the nation's 103 nuclear power reactors were sold to independent power producers. Deregulation has been accompanied by substantial market consolidation, and today the three largest companies control one-third of US nuclear capacity. We find that deregulation and consolidation are associated with a 10 percent increase in operating performance, achieved primarily by reducing the duration of reactor outages. At average wholesale prices, this increased operating performance is worth $2.5 billion annually and implies an annual decrease of 35 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions. (JEL L11, L51, L94, L98, Q42, Q48)

Suggested Citation

  • Lucas W. Davis & Catherine Wolfram, 2012. "Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency: Evidence from US Nuclear Power," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 194-225, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:4:y:2012:i:4:p:194-225
    DOI: 10.1257/app.4.4.194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Christopher R. Knittel, 2002. "Alternative Regulatory Methods And Firm Efficiency: Stochastic Frontier Evidence From The U.S. Electricity Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 530-540, August.
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    6. Jennifer K. Shanefelter, 2008. "Restructuring, Ownership and Efficiency: The Case of Labor in Electricity Generation," EAG Discussions Papers 200812, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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