Nonlinear Pricing with Underutilization: A Theory of Multi-part Tariffs
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220199
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
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