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Job Displacement Insurance and (the Lack of) Consumption-Smoothing

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  • François Gerard
  • Joana Naritomi

Abstract

We study the spending profile of workers who experience both a positive transitory income shock (lump-sum severance pay) and a negative permanent income shock (layoff ). Using de-identified expenditure and employment data from Brazil, we show that workers increase spending at layoff by 35 percent despite experiencing a 14 percent long-term loss. We find high sensitivity of spending to cash-on-hand across consumption categories and for several sources of variation, including predictable income drops. A model with present-biased workers can rationalize our findings, and highlights the importance of the timing of benefit disbursement for the consumption-smoothing gains of job displacement insurance policies.

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  • François Gerard & Joana Naritomi, 2021. "Job Displacement Insurance and (the Lack of) Consumption-Smoothing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(3), pages 899-942, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:3:p:899-942
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190388
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    Cited by:

    1. Pinotti, Paolo & Bhalotra, Sonia & Britto, Diogo & Sampaio, Breno, 2021. "Job Displacement, Unemployment Benefits and Domestic Violence," CEPR Discussion Papers 16350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Marcela Ibanez & Sebastian O. Schneider, 2023. "Income Risk, Precautionary Saving, and Loss Aversion – An Empirical Test," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2023_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    3. Britto, Diogo & Melo, Caíque & Sampaio, Breno, 2022. "The Kids Aren't Alright: Parental Job Loss and Children's Outcomes within and beyond Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 15591, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Diogo G. C. Britto & Paolo Pinotti & Breno Sampaio, 2022. "The Effect of Job Loss and Unemployment Insurance on Crime in Brazil," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1393-1423, July.
    5. Ana Margarida Fernandes & Joana Silva, 2023. "Adjusting to Transitory Shocks: Worker Impact, Firm Channels, and (Lack of) Income Support," CESifo Working Paper Series 10479, CESifo.
    6. Kirsten Sehnbruch & Rafael Carranza Navarrete & Dante Contreras Guajardo, 2022. "Unemployment Insurance in Transition and Developing Countries: Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity Constraints in Chile," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 58(10), pages 2089-2109, October.
    7. Donald O. Parsons, 2023. "How should job displacement wage losses be insured?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 446-446, July.
    8. Antonia Asenjo & Verónica Escudero & Hannah Liepmann, 2024. "Why Should we Integrate Income and Employment Support? A Conceptual and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 60(1), pages 1-29, January.
    9. Anna Sokolova, 2023. "Marginal Propensity to Consume and Unemployment: a Meta-analysis," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 813-846, December.
    10. Fadlon, Itzik & Laibson, David, 2022. "Paternalism and pseudo-rationality: An illustration based on retirement savings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    11. Zhang, Guangli, 2021. "The Effect of Unemployment Benefit Pay Frequency on UI Claimants' Job Search Behaviors," Working Papers 21-3, Sinquefield Center for Applied Economic Research, Saint Louis University.
    12. Sehnbruch, Kirsten & Carranza, Rafael & Contreras, Dante, 2020. "Unemployment insurance in Chile: lessons from a high inequality developing country," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107824, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Jim Been & Eduard Suari‐Andreu & Marike Knoef & Rob Alessie, 2024. "Consumption and time use responses to unemployment: Implications for the lifecycle model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 91(361), pages 1-32, January.
    14. Timmons, Shane & Robertson, Deirdre & Lunn, Pete, 2022. "Combining nudges and boosts to increase precautionary saving: A large-scale field experiment," Papers WP722, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    15. Momi Dahan & Udi Nisan, 2020. "Late Payments, Liquidity Constraints and the Mismatch between Due Dates and Paydays," CESifo Working Paper Series 8733, CESifo.
    16. Arash Nekoei, 2022. "Will Markets Provide Humane Jobs? A Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 9533, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • G51 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - Household Savings, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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