1. Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Ichiro Obara, . "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Selling Service Plans to Differentially Informed Customers," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-125, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
3. Feess,Eberhard & Schieble,Michael & Markus,Walzl, 2004. "When should principals acquire verifiable information?," Research Memoranda 049, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
4. James Malcomson, 2004. "Principal and Expert Agent," Economics Series Working Papers 193, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • James M. Malcomson, 2009. "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 9(1). [Downloadable!]
5. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2008. "A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1680, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
6. Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition," Staff General Research Papers 12709, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009. "Auctions with costly information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. George Loewenstein & Don Moore & Roberto Weber, 2006. "Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 281-295, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse27_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
10. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Goeschl, Timo & Lin, Tun, 2004. "Endogenous Information Structures in Conservation Contracting," Staff Paper Series 479, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
12. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2009. "A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000076, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
13. Iossa, Elisabetta & Legros, Patrick, 2001. "Third Party Monitoring and Golden Parachutes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors," Discussion Papers 237, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
15. Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2008. "Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 201, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 27 Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
16. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2007. "Information Acquisition and Refunds for Returns," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2007. "Information Acquisition and Refunds for Returns," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 54, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
17. Doh Shin Jeon, . "Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation," Economics Working Papers 623, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
18. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2008. "Information Gathering and Marketing," Working Papers 08-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
20. Ulf Schiller, 1997. "Decentral Information Acquisition and the Value of Cost Observability," Game Theory and Information 9710003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
21. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2005. "Information Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
22. Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2004. "Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1420, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
23. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 12534, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," IDEI Working Papers 284, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
25. Ichiro Obara, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1). [Downloadable!]
26. Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles, 2003. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms wth Costly Information Acquisition," IDEI Working Papers 205, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
27. Grigorieva, Elena & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2006. "The family of c-bisection auctions: efficiency and running time," Research Memoranda 019, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.