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The Bright Side of Private Benefits

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  • Hori, Kazumi

Abstract

In many cases, the cost of an agent acquiring information is lower than that for the principal. However, because of a private benefit difference between the principal's and agent's preferences, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent's advantage. This paper considers the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing him/her to report it truthfully. As usual, the larger the private benefit, the larger the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time, the private benefit may reduce the cost of motivating information acquisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a different preference is desirable.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/16995/1/070econDP06-01.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2006-01.

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Length: 27 p.
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2006-01

Note: May 1, 2006
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  1. Cremer, J. & Khalil, F. & Rochet, J-C., 1997. "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Papers 97.468, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  2. Cremer, J. & Khalil, F. & Rochet, J.-C., 1997. "Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9708, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  3. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
  4. Stole, Lars A, 1992. "The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 582-606, October.
  5. Takao Kato & Motohiro Morishima, 1998. "The Productivity Effects of Human Resource Management Practices: Evidence from New Japanese Panel Data," Macroeconomics 9812003, EconWPA, revised 08 Dec 1998.
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