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Price cap regulation, revenue sharing and information acquisition

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  • Iossa, Elisabetta
  • Stroffolini, Francesca

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  • Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2005. "Price cap regulation, revenue sharing and information acquisition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 217-230, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:17:y:2005:i:2:p:217-230
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lyon, Thomas P, 1996. "A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 227-247, May.
    2. Sappington, David E. M. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1996. "Revenue sharing in incentive regulation plans," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 229-248, September.
    3. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 174-193, November.
    4. Lewis Tracy R. & Sappington David E. M., 1993. "Ignorance in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 169-183, October.
    5. Clements, Michael E., 0. "Local telephone quality-of-service: a framework and empirical evidence," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(5-6), pages 413-426, June.
    6. Sappington David E. M., 2003. "The Effects of Incentive Regulation on Retail Telephone Service Quality in the United States," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(4), pages 1-21, December.
    7. Richard Schmalensee, 1989. "Good Regulatory Regimes," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 417-436, Autumn.
    8. Philip Burns & Ralph Turvey & Thomas G. Weyman‐Jones, 1998. "The Behaviour of the Firm under Alternative Regulatory Constraints," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 133-157, May.
    9. Chunrong AI & Salvador Martinez & David Sappington, 2004. "Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 263-285, August.
    10. Gasmi, F & Ivaldi, M & Laffont, Jean Jacques, 1994. "Rent Extraction and Incentives for Efficiency in Recent Regulatory Proposals," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 151-176, May.
    11. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
    12. Banerjee, Aniruddha, 2003. "Does incentive regulation 'cause' degradation of retail telephone service quality?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 243-269, June.
    13. M.E. Beesley & S.C. Littlechild, 1989. "The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 454-472, Autumn.
    14. Colin Mayer & John Vickers, 1996. "Profit-sharing regulation: an economic appraisal," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 17(1), pages 1-18, February.
    15. Ai, Chunrong & Sappington, David E M, 2002. "The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 133-159, September.
    16. Burns, Philip & Turvey, Ralph & Weyman-Jones, Thomas G, 1998. "The Behaviour of the Firm under Alternative Regulatory Constraints," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 133-157, May.
    17. Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2002. "Price cap regulation and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1013-1036, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hongjun Peng & Tao Pang & Fuliang Cao & Juan Zhao, 2018. "A Mutual Subsidy Mechanism for a Seasonal Product Supply Chain Channel Under Double Price Regulation," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 35(06), pages 1-26, December.
    2. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
    3. Stroffolini, Francesca, 2012. "Access profit-sharing regulation with information acquisition and transmission," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 161-174.
    4. Jamison, Mark & Mandy, David M. & Sappington, David E.M., 2014. "Motivating regulated suppliers to assess alternative technologies, protocols, and capital structures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 13-22.
    5. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    6. Abrardi, Laura & Cambini, Carlo, 2022. "Carpe Data: Protecting online privacy with naive users," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

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