This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
M.E. Beesley
S.C. Littlechild
Abstract

This article examines the experience in the United Kingdom with the regulation of privatized monopolies. Its conclusions are (1) that there are significant differences between RPI - X (or price-cap) and U.S. rate-of-return regulation, which provides greater scope for bargaining in the former system; (2) that U.K. regulators have taken seriously their duty to promote competition, but that the existing economic literature is of limited help in this task; (3) that price regulation is likely to be more effective where technology is changing slowly and/or where technology is changing rapidly; and (4) that the case for RPI - X price-cap, rather than rate-of-return regulation, is strongest in telecommunications, gas supply, and electricity supply and least strong in gas and electricity transmission grids.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28198923%2920%3A3%3C454%3ATROPMI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 454-472
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:autumn:p:454-472

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michele Moretto & Paolo M. Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2007. "Profit Sharing and Investment by Regulated Utilities: a Welfare Analysis," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0059, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Paolo Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2008. "Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 253-274, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Giannakis, D. & T. Jamasb & Pollitt, M.G., 2004. "Benchmarking and incentive regulation of quality of service: an application to the UK electricity distribution utilities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0408, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  4. Andrew Powell, 1996. "Sobre la reestructuración, regulación y competencia en el sector de servicios públicos: experiencia del Reino Unido y sus implicaciones para América Latina," RES Working Papers 4039, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Paul L Joskow, 2005. "Incentive Regulation In Theory And Practice - Electricity Distribution And Transmission Networks," Working Papers 0514, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E. M. Sappington, 1998. "Setting the X Factor in Price Cap Regulation Plans," NBER Working Papers 6622, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Noel Uri & Florence Setzer, 2003. "Assessing the Performance of the Price Cap Plan for Local Exchange Carriers in the United States," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 263-276, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Roques, F.A. & Savva , N.S., 2006. "Price Cap Regulation and Investment Incentives under Demand Uncertainty," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0636, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  9. Pobochy Serguey & Yudashkina Galina, 2006. "Regional aspects of electricity sector regulations in Russia," EERC Working Paper Series 05-15e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  10. Carlo Scarpa & Paolo Panteghini, 2001. "Incentives to (Irreversible) Investments Under Different Regulatory Regimes," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Panteghini, Paolo M. & Scarpa, Carlo, 2003. "Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  12. Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07. [Downloadable!]
  13. Thomas Weyman-Jones, 2001. "Yardstick and incentive issues in UK electricity distribution price controls," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 22(2), pages 233-247, June. [Downloadable!]
  14. Sudong Ye & Robert L. K. Tiong, 2003. "Tariff adjustment frameworks for privately financed infrastructure projects," Construction Management & Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 409-419, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Spiller, Pablo T. & Vogelsang, Ingo & DEC, 1994. "Regulation, institutions, and commitment in the British telecommunications sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1241, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  16. Michele Moretto & Paolo Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2003. "Investment Size and Firm's Value under Profit Sharing Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Andrew Powell, 1996. "On Restructuring, Regulation, and Competition in Utility Industries: Experience in the United Kingdom and Implications for Latin America," RES Working Papers 4038, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  18. Ingo Vogelsang, 2005. "Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Vladimir Hlasny, 2008. "The impact of restructuring and deregulation on gas rates," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 27-52, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Paolo Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2003. "The Distributional Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes: A Real Option Approach," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 403-418, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Jeffrey Bernstein & Juan Hernandez & Jose Rodriguez & Agustin Ros, 2006. "X-Factor updating and total factor productivity growth: the case of peruvian telecommunications, 1996–2003," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 316-342, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is also providing many rankings, for example of authors and institutions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.