Advanced Search

Profit-sharing regulation: an economic appraisal

Contents:

Author Info

  • Colin Mayer
  • John Vickers

Abstract

The stock market, take-over bidders, executive pay setters, perhaps Stephen Littlechild himself, even last summer’s weather, all seem to have been undermining RPI-X price-cap regulation. Until recently, price-cap regulation was regarded as demonstrably superior to US-style rate-of-return regulation, and regulatory reform in several countries has embraced price-cap regulation.2 But in Britain, where price- cap regulation originated, the case now appears to be less compelling: price-cap regulation is perceived by some as conferring unwarranted profits on the utilities and imposing unsustainable demands on regulators. As a consequence, many people believe that we are slipping inexorably into some form of profit regulation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ifs.org.uk/fs/articles/fsmayer.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Institute for Fiscal Studies in its journal Fiscal Studies.

Volume (Year): 17 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 1-18
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ifs:fistud:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:1-18

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Institute for Fiscal Studies 7 Ridgmount Street LONDON WC1E 7AE
Phone: (+44) 020 7291 4800
Fax: (+44) 020 7323 4780
Email:
Web page: http://www.ifs.org.uk

Order Information:
Postal: The Institute for Fiscal Studies 7 Ridgmount Street LONDON WC1E 7AE
Email:

For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Emma Hyman).

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
  2. Braeutigam, Ronald R., 1993. "A regulatory bargain for diversified enterprises," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, March.
  3. Greenstein, Shane & McMaster, Susan & Spiller, Pablo T, 1995. "The Effect of Incentive Regulation on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of Digital Technology," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 187-236, Summer.
  4. H.S. Shin, 1994. "News Management and the Value of Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 58-71, Spring.
  5. Richard Schmalensee, 1989. "Good Regulatory Regimes," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 417-436, Autumn.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
  1. Lucy Chennells, 1997. "The windfall tax," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 279-291, August.
  2. Michele Moretto & Paolo M. Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2006. "Profit Sharing and Investment by Regulated Utilities: A Welfare Analysis," Working Papers ubs0611, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
  3. Kirkpatrick, Colin & Parker, David & Zhang, Yin-Fang, 2004. "Price and Profit Regulation in Developing and Transition Economies, Methods Used and Problems Faced: A Survey of the Regulators," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30596, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
  4. Jose Luis Lima R & Andres Gomez Lobo, 2004. "Good Regulatory Lags for Price Cap and Rolling Cap contracts," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 278, Econometric Society.
  5. Carlo Scarpa & Paolo Panteghini, 2001. "Incentives to (Irreversible) Investments Under Different Regulatory Regimes," CESifo Working Paper Series 417, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. David Hawdon & Lester C. Hunt & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2005. "Optimal sliding scale regulation: An application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales," Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics Discussion Papers (SEEDS) 111, Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  7. Michele Moretto & Paolo Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2003. "Investment Size and Firm's Value under Profit Sharing Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1040, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Nicolas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 1998. "Regulating drug prices: where do we go from here?," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 321-342, August.
  9. Paolo Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2008. "Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 253-274, September.
  10. Johan den Hertog, 2010. "Review of Economic Theories of Regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
  11. Paolo M. Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2003. "Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series 934, CESifo Group Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ifs:fistud:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:1-18

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Emma Hyman).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.