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Grundformen der Entgeltregulierung: Vor- und Nachteile von Price-Cap, Revenue-Cap und hybriden Ansätzen

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  • Franz, Oliver
  • Schäffner, Daniel
  • Trage, Bastian

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  • Franz, Oliver & Schäffner, Daniel & Trage, Bastian, 2005. "Grundformen der Entgeltregulierung: Vor- und Nachteile von Price-Cap, Revenue-Cap und hybriden Ansätzen," WIK Discussion Papers 267, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wikdps:267
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    6. Knieps, Günter, 2000. "Price Cap als innovatives Regulierungsinstrument in liberalisierten Netzsektoren," Discussion Papers 65, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    7. Christian Von Hirschhausen, 2006. "Reform de"r Erdgaswirtschaft in der EU und in Deutschland: Wie viel Regulierung braucht der Wettbewerb?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(1), pages 89-103, February.
    8. Brunekreeft, Gert, 2000. "Kosten, Körbe, Konkurrenz: Price Caps in der Theorie," Discussion Papers 67, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    9. Knieps, Günter, 2001. "Netzsektoren zwischen Regulierung und Wettbewerb," Discussion Papers 76, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    10. Hense, Andreas & Schäffner, Daniel, 2004. "Regulatorische Aufgaben im Energiebereich – ein europäischer Vergleich," WIK Discussion Papers 254, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    11. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
    12. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
    13. Braeutigam, Ronald R & Panzar, John C, 1993. "Effects of the Change from Rate-of-Return to Price-Cap Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 191-198, May.
    14. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1996. "Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States: Some Lessons," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 211-225, May.
    15. David Sappington, 1980. "Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 360-372, Spring.
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