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On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant

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  • Benford, Frank A.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

    Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 1 (July)
    Pages: 1-25

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:36:y:1998:i:1:p:1-25

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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    1. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    2. Gaudet, Gerard & Lassere, Pierre & Long, Ngo Van, 1995. "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 715-49, August.
    3. James W. Vaupel & Jon C. Sonstelie & Paul R. Portney, 1982. "Truth or consequences: Cost revelation and regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 2(2), pages 280-284.
    4. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
    5. David P. Baron & Roger B. Myerson, 1979. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 412, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    7. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(5), pages 857-60, October.
    8. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
    9. Bulckaen, Fabrizio, 1997. "Emissions Charge and Asymmetric Information: Consistently a Problem?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 100-106, September.
    10. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    12. Sappington, David E M & Sibley, David S, 1990. "Regulating without Cost Information: Further Observations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1027-29, November.
    13. Baron, David P & Besanko, David, 1987. "Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 413-36, July.
    14. Griffin, Ronald C., 1987. "Environmental policy for spatial and persistent pollutants," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 41-53, March.
    15. Baron, David P., 1985. "Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 211-231, November.
    16. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
    17. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    18. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
    19. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    20. Kwerel, Evan, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601, October.
    21. Sappington, David E M & Sibley, David S, 1988. "Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 297-306, May.
    22. Olli Tahvonen, 1995. "Dynamics of pollution control when damage is sensitive to the rate of pollution accumulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 9-27, January.
    23. Finsinger, Jorg & Vogelsang, Ingo, 1985. "Strategic Management Behavior under Reward Structures in a Planned Economy [Reward Structures in a Planned Economy: The Problem of Incentives and Efficient Allocation of Resources]," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 263-69, February.
    24. David Sappington, 1980. "Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 360-372, Spring.
    25. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April.
    26. Falk Ita & Mendelsohn Robert, 1993. "The Economics of Controlling Stock Pollutants: An Efficient Strategy for Greenhouse Gases," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 76-88, July.
    27. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1982. "Design of incentive schemes and the new Soviet Incentive model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 127-148.
    28. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 901-926, June.
    29. Beavis, Brian & Dobbs, Ian M., 1986. "The dynamics of optimal environmental regulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 415-423, September.
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    Cited by:
    1. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 385-403, September.
    2. Shuichi Ohori, 2007. "Dynamic environmental taxes in an international duopoly," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research 628, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Tarui, Nori & Polasky, Stephen, 2003. "Environmental Regulation With Innovation And Learning: Rules Versus Discretion," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 21911, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    4. Newell, Richard G. & Pizer, William A., 2003. "Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 416-432, March.
    5. Farmer, Amy & Kahn, James R. & McDonald, Judith A. & O'Neill, Robert, 2001. "Rethinking the optimal level of environmental quality: justifications for strict environmental policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 461-473, March.
    6. Tarui, Nori, 2002. "Intertemporal Permit Trading For Stock Pollutants With Uncertainty," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 19752, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 517-526, July.
    8. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
    9. Tsur, Yacov & Zemel, Amos, 2002. "The Regulation of Environmental Innovations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 242-260, September.
    10. Tarui, Nori & Polasky, Stephen, 2005. "Environmental regulation with technology adoption, learning and strategic behavior," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 447-467, November.
    11. Francisco Candel-Sánchez, 2012. "Pigouvian taxes and the Varian’s mechanism in dynamic settings," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 39-51, August.
    12. Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 56-59, January.

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