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Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Faillo, Marco & Grieco, Daniela & Zarri, Luca, 2013. "Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 271-283.
  2. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "Group size effect and over-punishment in the case of third party enforcement of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 395-412.
  3. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2012. "Is altruism bad for cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 330-341.
  4. Tan, Fangfang & Xiao, Erte, 2018. "Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-46.
  5. James Andreoni & Laura K. Gee, 2011. "Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?," NBER Working Papers 17033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Wei, Chen, 2020. "Can job rotation eliminate the Ratchet effect: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 66-84.
  7. Lim Wooyoung & Zhang Jipeng, 2020. "Endogenous Authority and Enforcement in Public Goods Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-22, June.
  8. Fenske, James, 2014. "Imachi Nkwu: Trade and the Commons," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 39-68, March.
  9. Gaechter, S. & Mengel, F. & Tsakas, E. & Vostroknutov, A., 2013. "Growth and inequality in public good games," Research Memorandum 070, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  10. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  11. Glöckner, Andreas & Kube, Sebastian & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "The joint benefits of observed and unobserved social sanction," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 13, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
  12. Vyrastekova, Jana & Funaki, Yukihiko & Takeuchi, Ai, 2011. "Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 919-928.
  13. Aurelie Ouss & Alexander Peysakhovich, 2015. "When Punishment Doesn't Pay: "Cold Glow" and Decisions to Punish," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
  14. Both, F. & Adam, M.T.P. & Hariharan, A. & Dorner, V. & Lux, E. & Weinhardt, C., 2016. "A randomized tabu search-based approach for perfect stranger matching in economic experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 235-238.
  15. Goeschl, Timo & Haberl, Beatrix & Soldà, Alice, 2023. "How to Organize Monitoring and Punishment: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0737, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  16. de Melo, Gioia & Piaggio, Matías, 2015. "The perils of peer punishment: Evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 376-393.
  17. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Noussair, Charles N. & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 797-807.
  18. Molnar, Andras & Chaudhry, Shereen J. & Loewenstein, George, 2023. "“It’s not about the money. It’s about sending a message!” Avengers want offenders to understand the reason for revenge," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
  19. Fenske, James, 2014. "Imachi Nkwu: Trade and the Commons," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(01), pages 39-68, March.
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