Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alessandro Innocenti

    ()

Abstract

This paper analyses the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In his work, Harsanyi (1956) draws Nash’s solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930). Whereas Schelling (1960) proposes a multi-faceted theory of conflict that, without dismissing the assumption of rational behaviour, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi and Schelling’s contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry, as postulated by Nash (1950), are then presented. The analysis of this debate illustrates that, although in the early 1960s two different approaches to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, only Harsanyi’s insights were fully developed later. Lastly, the causes of this evolution are assessed.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/quaderni/468.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 468.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:468

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Piazza S.Francesco,7 - 53100 Siena
Phone: (39)(0577)232620
Fax: (39)(0577)232661
Email:
Web page: http://www.deps.unisi.it/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: bargaining; game theory; symmetry;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. W. Krelle & M. Badke & F. Schneider & J. Brunner & R. Vaubel & J. Melitz & C. Schmidt & A. Jaeger & D. Elixmann, 1991. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 95-127, February.
    • K. Paqué & J. Hartog & F. Schneider & M. Rauscher & H. Herberg & J. Graf v. d. Schulenburg & P. Schönfeld, 1990. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 83-98, February.
    • R. Boadway & D. Blanchet & L. Toulemon & S. Estrin & P. Kleindorfer & F. Schneider, 1996. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 213-232, June.
    • E. Streissler & C. Puppe & M. Pasche & C. Schmidt & I. Vogelsang & F. Schneider & M. Neumann & G. Debelle & P. Welfens, 1999. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 209-233, June.
    • M. Shubik & K. Okuguchi & K. Borchardt & F. Schneider, 1990. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 207-218, June.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  3. Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May.
  4. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 109-112, October.
  5. Myerson, Roger, 2001. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 20-25, July.
  6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  7. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
  8. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier.
  9. Robert J. Leonard, 1992. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash / or / The Emergence and Stabilization of the Nash equilibrium," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9214, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  10. John C. Harsanyi, 1957. "Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponents' Utility Function," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 46, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Nicola Giocoli, 2004. "Nash Equilibrium," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 639-666, Winter.
  12. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 445-454, July.
  13. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  14. B. Priddat & G. Tullock & M. Shubik & S. Sheffrin, 1993. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 203-213, June.
    • Karen Ehlers & M. Shubik & R. Gardner & G. Tichy & N. Long & F. Scherer & M. Burda & Gerlinde Sinn, 1993. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 203-223, June.
    • M. Shubik & G. Laan & I. Kubin & E. Dietzenbacher & K. Spremann & U. Schweizer & K. Milford & H. Niida & F. Butschek & K. Rothschild, 1991. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 299-324, October.
    • C. Seidl & D. Archibugi & M. Shubik & M. Peitz & D. Lévy & J. Lothian & G. Hufbauer & C. Lülfesmann & U. Backes-Gellner & P. Moog, 2001. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 202-225, June.
    • M. Shubik & K. Okuguchi & K. Borchardt & F. Schneider, 1990. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 207-218, June.
    • M. Shubik & G. Uhlich & M. Kemp & W. Enders & U. Kamecke & G. Fraja & W. Walker & J. Burbidge, 1997. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 206-221, June.
  15. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(2), pages 187-194, January.
  16. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(3), pages 316-322, April.
  17. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," LERNA Working Papers 11.23.357, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  2. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2010. "Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals," TSE Working Papers 10-192, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  3. Alessandro Innocenti, 2008. "How can a psychologist inform economics? The strange case of Sidney Siegel," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0808, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
  4. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," TSE Working Papers 11-274, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  5. Innocenti, Alessandro, 2010. "How a psychologist informed economics: The case of Sidney Siegel," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 421-434, June.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:468. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.