This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alessandro Innocenti ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper analyses the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In his work, Harsanyi (1956) draws Nash’s solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930). Whereas Schelling (1960) proposes a multi-faceted theory of conflict that, without dismissing the assumption of rational behaviour, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi and Schelling’s contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry, as postulated by Nash (1950), are then presented. The analysis of this debate illustrates that, although in the early 1960s two different approaches to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, only Harsanyi’s insights were fully developed later. Lastly, the causes of this evolution are assessed.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/quaderni/468.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 468.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:468

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Piazza S.Francesco,7 - 53100 Siena
Phone: (39)(0577)298645
Fax: (39)(0577)298661
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti).

Related research
Keywords: bargaining; game theory; symmetry;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John C. Harsanyi, 1957. "Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponents' Utility Function," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 46, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robert Sugden, 2001. "The evolutionary turn in game theory," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 113-130, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Putnam, Robert D, 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-60, Summer.
  7. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    Other versions:
  8. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. M. Shubik & K. Okuguchi & K. Borchardt & F. Schneider, 1990. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 207-218, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • C. Seidl & D. Archibugi & M. Shubik & M. Peitz & D. Lévy & J. Lothian & G. Hufbauer & C. Lülfesmann & U. Backes-Gellner & P. Moog, 2001. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 202-225, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • E. Streissler & C. Puppe & M. Pasche & C. Schmidt & I. Vogelsang & F. Schneider & M. Neumann & G. Debelle & P. Welfens, 1999. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 209-233, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • B. Priddat & G. Tullock & M. Shubik & S. Sheffrin, 1993. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 203-213, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Karen Ehlers & M. Shubik & R. Gardner & G. Tichy & N. Long & F. Scherer & M. Burda & Gerlinde Sinn, 1993. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 203-223, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • R. Boadway & D. Blanchet & L. Toulemon & S. Estrin & P. Kleindorfer & F. Schneider, 1996. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 213-232, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • K. Paqué & J. Hartog & F. Schneider & M. Rauscher & H. Herberg & J. Graf v. d. Schulenburg & P. Schönfeld, 1990. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 83-98, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • M. Shubik & G. Laan & I. Kubin & E. Dietzenbacher & K. Spremann & U. Schweizer & K. Milford & H. Niida & F. Butschek & K. Rothschild, 1991. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 299-324, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • M. Shubik & G. Uhlich & M. Kemp & W. Enders & U. Kamecke & G. Fraja & W. Walker & J. Burbidge, 1997. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 206-221, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • W. Krelle & M. Badke & F. Schneider & J. Brunner & R. Vaubel & J. Melitz & C. Schmidt & A. Jaeger & D. Elixmann, 1991. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 95-127, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June. [Downloadable!]
  12. Myerson, Roger, 2001. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 20-25, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alessandro Innocenti, 2008. "How can a psychologist inform economics? The strange case of Sidney Siegel," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0808, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.