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On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining

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Author Info
Rubinstein, A.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 7-92.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavsa:7-92

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Postal: Tel-Aviv University, The Sackler Institute of Economic Studies, Ramat Aviv 69 978 Tel-Aviv, Israel.
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Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/
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Related research
Keywords: game theory economic equilibrium contracts economic models

Cited by:
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  1. Robert Cooter, 1997. "Commodifying Liability," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1136, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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