On the Emergence of Social Norms
AbstractWe consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We details the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0704.
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
Phone: +44 (0)1227 764000
Fax: +44 (0)1227 827850
Web page: http://www.ukc.ac.uk/economics/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2007-06-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2007-06-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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