On the Emergence of Social Conformity
AbstractWe consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and a non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the popultion can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0501.
Date of creation: Jan 2005
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2005-02-01 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-02-01 (Regulation)
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