On the Emergence of Social Conformity

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On the Emergence of Social Conformity

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Edward Cartwright ()

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Edward John Cartwright

Abstract

We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and a non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the popultion can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0501.

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Date of creation: Jan 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0501

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-02-01 (All new papers)
NEP-EVO-2005-02-01 (Evolutionary Economics)
NEP-REG-2005-02-01 (Regulation)

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Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shiller, Robert J, 1995. "Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 181-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Robert J. Shiller, 1995. "Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1092, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Juang, Wei-Torng, 2001. "Learning from Popularity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 735-47, May.
Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
George A. Akerlof, 1978. "A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence," Special Studies Papers 118, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Other versions:
- Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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