The literature on public goods provision has experienced a significant increase since Samuelson's (1954) paper. The common goal is to make the model more suitable to describe a more general class of non-rival goods. However, there does not seem to be a consensus in the literature on the form of the function to be used to describe the externality created by the public good. In this note we try to show the hypotheses underlying the functions used. The different models proposed are optimal when used in the right framework and this should be kept in mind when choosing the function in relation to the type of public good to be studied.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Brescia, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
0903.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006.
"Size and Soft Budget Constraints,"
Working Papers
2006-13, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006.
"Size and soft budget constraints,"
Discussion Papers
172, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]