Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh

Contents:

Author Info

  • Masahiro Shoji

    ( Faculty of Economics, Seijo University)

Abstract

   This study empirically disentangles the channels of peer effects in crime through an experiment conducted in rural Bangladesh. The first part of this study assumes that individuals exhibit guilt aversion, which predicts the peer effects via guilt sensitivity and belief. By incorporating peer effects in a take-away game, the criminal player is informed about the victim player's belief only in the treatment group, so that the peer effects in the treatment group are driven only through guilt sensitivity. The experime ntal results suggest that peer effects affect and bring about changes in belief. The second part elicits guilt sensitivity to test guilt aversion. I find robust supporting evidence for my results, and reject the alternatives such as pure altruism and trustw orthiness. Finally, external validity is also confirmed: the criminal behaviour of subjects in the experiment is correlated with their attitude towards illegal activities in the real wo rld, and individuals are less likely to suffer from property crime in villages with a higher guilt sensitivity neighbourhood.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2014/2014cf923.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-923.

as in new window
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2014cf923

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033
Phone: +81-3-5841-5644
Fax: +81-3-5841-8294
Email:
Web page: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2008. "The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse15_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2008. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 2491, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Sah, R.K., 1990. "Social Osmosis And Patterns Of Crime: A Dynamic Economic Analysis," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center 609, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  4. Francesco Guala & Luigi Mittone, 2005. "Experiments in economics: External validity and the robustness of phenomena," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 495-515.
  5. Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou, 2012. "Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-31.
  6. Lindbeck, A, 1996. "Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 622, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  7. Gordon Dahl & Stefano DellaVigna, 2007. "Does Movie Violence Increase Violent Crime?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001778, David K. Levine.
  8. Manski, Charles F, 1993. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 531-42, July.
  9. David Amdur & Ethan Schmick, 2013. "Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 687-693.
  10. Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 115-136, Summer.
  11. Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," IZA Discussion Papers 2293, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. Reiner Eichenberger & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1998. "Rational moralists: The role of fairness in democratic economic politics," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 191-210, January.
  13. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2007. "Testing Guilt Aversion," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 683, Stockholm School of Economics.
  14. Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  15. Gaviria, Alejandro & Pages, Carmen, 2002. "Patterns of crime victimization in Latin American cities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 181-203, February.
  16. James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2007. "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 07-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  17. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2012. "Deception: The Role of Guilt," Working Papers 457, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  18. Ernst Fehr & Karla Hoff, 2011. "Introduction: Tastes, Castes and Culture: the Influence of Society on Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(556), pages F396-F412, November.
  19. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, . "Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior - Testing ‘Conditional Cooperation’ in a Field Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 162, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  20. Glaeser, Edward L & Sacerdote, Bruce & Scheinkman, Jose A, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 507-48, May.
  21. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2002. ""Crime" in the lab-detecting social interaction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 859-869, May.
  22. Patricia Funk, 2005. "Governmental Action, Social Norms, and Criminal Behavior," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 522-, September.
  23. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
  24. Basit Zafar, 2009. "An experimental investigation of why individuals conform," Staff Reports 365, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  25. Iris Bohnet & Richard Zeckhauser, 2004. "Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 495-510, October.
  26. Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0127h86v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  27. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Marcel Fafchamps & Christine Moser, 2003. "Crime, Isolation and Law Enforcement," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 12(4), pages 625-671, December.
  29. Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald & Martin Strobel, 2010. "Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation using Equilibrium ad Stated Belief Models," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 1011, CIRPEE.
  30. Jeffrey R. Kling & Jens Ludwig, 2005. "Is Crime Contagious?," Working Papers 85, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  31. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
  32. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
  33. Topi Miettinen & Sigrid Suetens, 2008. "Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(6), pages 945-960, December.
  34. Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2012. "Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 17-34.
  35. Reuben, Ernesto & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2009. "Is mistrust self-fulfilling?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 89-91, August.
  36. Loewenstein, George, 1999. "Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages F23-34, February.
  37. Lederman, Daniel & Loayza, Norman & Menendez, Ana Maria, 2002. "Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 509-39, April.
  38. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality''," Law and Economics, EconWPA 9506001, EconWPA.
  39. Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 1998. "Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-37, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  40. Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Qiu, Jianying & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 145-164.
  41. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics.
  42. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2007. "Guilt in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 170-176, May.
  43. Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves, 2008. "The strength of weak ties in crime," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 209-236, February.
  44. Jens Ludwig & Greg J. Duncan & Paul Hirschfield, 2001. "Urban Poverty And Juvenile Crime: Evidence From A Randomized Housing-Mobility Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 655-679, May.
  45. Mikkel Barslund & John Rand & Finn Tarp & Jacinto Chiconela, 2005. "Understanding Victimization: The Case of Mozambique," Discussion Papers 05-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  46. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
  47. Christoph Vanberg, 2008. "Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1467-1480, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2014cf923. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CIRJE administrative office).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.