Surprising Gifts - Theory and Laboratory Evidence
AbstractPeople do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in two dictator game experiments. Experiment 1 shows a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations on dictators' transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both, positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Experiment 2 shows that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Cologne, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 61.
Date of creation: 09 May 2013
Date of revision:
guilt aversion; surprise seeking; dictator game; consensus effect;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-06-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2013-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2013-06-04 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-06-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2013-06-04 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-UPT-2013-06-04 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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