Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?

Contents:

Author Info

  • David, Amdur
  • Ethan, Schmick

Abstract

We compare the strategy and direct-response methods in a one-shot trust game with hidden action. In our experiment, the decision elicitation method affects neither participants' behavior nor their beliefs about this behavior. We conclude that the direct-response method does not, by itself, induce guilt aversion.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40148/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40157/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40148.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40148

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Trust; guilt aversion; strategy method; direct-response method; behavioral economics; experimental economics;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. David Amdur & Ethan Schmick, 2013. "Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 687-693.
  2. Reuben, Ernesto & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2008. "Is mistrust self-fulfilling?," MPRA Paper 10653, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series 336, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2010. "Testing guilt aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 95-107, January.
  5. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
  6. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
  7. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2007. "Guilt in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 170-176, May.
  8. Christoph Vanberg, 2008. "Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1467-1480, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. David Amdur & Ethan Schmick, 2013. "Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 687-693.
  2. Alexander Smith, 2013. "Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 367-374, July.
  3. Masahiro Shoji, 2014. "Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-923, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40148. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.