Deception: The role of guilt
AbstractEvidence suggests that whether or not people dislike lying is situation-dependent. We argue that the theory of simple guilt can accommodate this well.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 93 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Deception; Guilt aversion; Experiments; Psychological games;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003.
"Promises & Partnership,"
Research Papers in Economics
2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0127h86v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt & Hansen, Lars Gaarn & Piovesan, Marco, 2013.
"Separating Will from Grace: An experiment on conformity and awareness in cheating,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 279-284.
- Toke Fosgaard & Lars Gaarn Hansen & Marco Piovesan, 2012. "Separating Will from Grace: An Experiment on Conformity and Awareness in Cheating," IFRO Working Paper 2012/15, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005.
"Dynamic Psychological Games,"
287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2007.
"Testing Guilt Aversion,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
683, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Gino, Francesca & Ayal, Shahar & Ariely, Dan, 2013. "Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical actions that benefit others," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 285-292.
- Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald & Martin Strobel, 2010.
"Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation using Equilibrium ad Stated Belief Models,"
Cahiers de recherche
- Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald & Martin Strobel, 2011. "Measuring the willingness to pay to avoid guilt: estimation using equilibrium and stated belief models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 437-453, 04.
- Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald & Martin Strobel, 2010. "Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation using Equilibrium and Stated Belief Models," Discussion Papers 10-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander & Strobel, Martin, 2010. "Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation Using Equilibrium and Stated Belief Models," IZA Discussion Papers 4803, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Reuben, Ernesto & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2009.
"Is mistrust self-fulfilling?,"
Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 89-91, August.
- Ismayilov, H. & Potters, J.J.M., 2012. "Promises as Commitments," Discussion Paper 2012-064, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 163-182, February.
- Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006.
"Promises and Partnership,"
Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
- Christoph Vanberg, 2008. "Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1467-1480, November.
- Sanjiv Erat & Uri Gneezy, 2012. "White Lies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(4), pages 723-733, April.
- Riccardo Ghidoni & Matteo Ploner, 2014. "When do the Expectations of Others Matter? An Experiment on Distributional Justice and Guilt Aversion," CEEL Working Papers 1403, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Shalvi, Shaul & Leiser, David, 2013. "Moral firmness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 400-407.
- Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2013. "Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression," Working Paper Series in Economics 47, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
- Azar, Ofer H. & Yosef, Shira & Bar-Eli, Michael, 2013. "Do customers return excessive change in a restaurant?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 219-226.
- Masahiro Shoji, 2014. "Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-923, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Morgulev, Elia & Azar, Ofer H. & Lidor, Ronnie & Sabag, Eran & Bar-Eli, Michael, 2014. "Deception and decision making in professional basketball: Is it beneficial to flop?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 108-118.
- Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias, 2013. "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 205-218.
- Reuben, Ernesto & Stephenson, Matt, 2013. "Nobody likes a rat: On the willingness to report lies and the consequences thereof," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 384-391.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.