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Organization, Learning and Cooperation

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Author Info

  • Jason Barr

    (Rutgers University)

  • Francesco Saraceno

    (OFCE)

Abstract

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival's output. We show how a firm's profit and cooperation rates are affected by its size, its rival's size and willingness to cooperate and environmental complexity.

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File URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/6782/resources/cournetcoop2008mar.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number 2004-001.

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Date of creation: Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6782

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Related research

Keywords: Artificial Neural Networks; Prisoner's Dilemma; Cooperation; Firm learning;

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References

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  1. Myong-Hun Chang & Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2004. "Agent-Based Models of Organizations," Economics Working Paper Archive 515, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  2. Ho, Teck-Hua, 1996. "Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 173-207.
  3. Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies from the Bottom Up," Staff General Research Papers 5075, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
  5. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
  6. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
  7. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
  8. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
  9. Stephen J. DeCanio & William E. Watkins, . "Information Processing and Organizational Structure," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 163, Society for Computational Economics.
  10. Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
  11. Cho, In-Koo, 1994. "Bounded Rationality, Neural Network and Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(6), pages 935-57, October.
  12. Ernst Fehr & Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd, 2003. "In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small- Scale Societies," Microeconomics 0305009, EconWPA.
  13. Casson, Mark, 1991. "The Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Performance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283751.
  14. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2005. "Cournot competition, organization and learning," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 277-295, January.
  15. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2002. "A computational theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 345-361, November.
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