Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms

Contents:

Author Info

  • Verboven, Frank

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-3SX1KSG-8/2/6ad52aa4aba8110b4df66aff290a8ad7
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 33 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 121-136

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:33:y:1997:i:1:p:121-136

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  2. Rees, R., 1993. "Tacit Collusion," Working Papers 1993-10, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  3. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
  4. repec:fth:guelph:1993-10 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
  6. Chang, Myong-Hun, 1991. "The effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 453-469, September.
  7. van Damme,Eric, 1986. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated Prisoner`s dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie A 84, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
  9. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-22, February.
  10. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1991. "The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 767-92, November.
  11. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  12. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
  13. Verboven, Frank, 1995. "Corporate restructuring in a collusive oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 335-354, September.
  14. Rees, Ray, 1993. "Tacit Collusion," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 27-40, Summer.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jason Barr & Francesco Saraceno, 2009. "Organization, learning and cooperation," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/9832, Sciences Po.
  2. Lass, Daniel, 2005. "Asymmetric Response of Retail Milk Prices in the Northeast Revisited," Research Reports 149026, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  3. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2005. "Cournot competition, organization and learning," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 277-295, January.
  4. Ganslandt, Mattias & Persson, Lars & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2008. "Asymmetric Cartels - a Theory of Ring Leaders," CEPR Discussion Papers 6829, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6782 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. David Collie, 2004. "Collusion and the elasticity of demand," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-6.
  7. Escrihuela-Villar, Marc, 2008. "Partial coordination and mergers among quantity-setting firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 803-810, May.
  8. Aitor Ciarreta & Carlos GutiƩrrez-Hita, 2012. "Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(3), pages 195-219, July.
  9. Cotterill, Ronald W. & Dhar, Tirtha Pratim, 2003. "Oligopoly Pricing with Differentiated Products: The Boston Fluid Milk Market Channel," Research Reports 25189, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  10. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/9832 is not listed on IDEAS

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:33:y:1997:i:1:p:121-136. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.