Public–Private Collusion
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09903-3
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
- Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Stefano Colombo, 2016. "Mixed oligopolies and collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 167-184, June.
- João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2018.
"Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 19-55, May.
- João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2017. "Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization," FEP Working Papers 590, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, 2009.
"Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, 2001. "Antitrust and the Not-For-Profit Sector," NBER Working Papers 8126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, 2006. "Antitrust in the Not-For-Profit Sector," NBER Working Papers 12132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Flavio Delbono & Luca Lambertini, 2016.
"Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Collusion,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 127-136, March.
- Flavio Delbono & Luca Lambertini, 2016. "Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Collusion," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 127-136, March.
- Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-227, March.
- Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2006.
"The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust,"
CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
- Farrell, Joseph & Katz, Michael L, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt1tw2d426, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Escrihuela-Villar, Marc, 2008. "Partial coordination and mergers among quantity-setting firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 803-810, May.
- Rothschild, R., 1999. "Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 717-734, July.
- Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2018.
"Government-leading welfare-improving collusion,"
International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 363-370.
- Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2017. "Government-Leading Welfare-Improving Collusion," MPRA Paper 77525, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Iwan Bos & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2010.
"Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 92-117, March.
- Iwan Bos & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2008. "Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms," Economics Working Paper Archive 544, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
- repec:bla:ecorec:v:77:y:2001:i:238:p:283-90 is not listed on IDEAS
- Delbono, Flavio & Lambertini, Luca, 2014.
"Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 156-159.
- F. Delbono & L. Lambertini, 2014. "Cartel Size and Collusive Stability with Non-Capitalistic Players," Working Papers wp948, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Helder Vasconcelos, 2005. "Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 39-62, Spring.
- Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion among asymmetric firms: The case of different discount factors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 289-307, June.
- Verboven, Frank, 1997. "Collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 121-136, May.
- Donsimoni, Marie-Paule, 1985. "Stable heterogeneous cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 451-467, December.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983.
"Profit-sharing in a collusive industry,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 59-74, June.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Working Papers 83-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 668, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mariana Cunha & Filipa Mota, 2020. "Coordinated Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 617-641, December.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1991. "The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 767-792, November.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
- David Sappington & J. Sidak, 2003. "Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(3), pages 183-206, May.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
- Mei Wen & Dan Sasaki, 2001. "Would Excess Capacity in Public Firms Be Socially Optimal?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 77(238), pages 283-290, September.
- Mattias Ganslandt & Lars Persson & Helder Vasconcelos, 2012. "Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 79(316), pages 766-791, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014.
"Asymmetric Collusion with Growing Demand,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 429-472, December.
- António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Asymmetric collusion with growing demand," FEP Working Papers 510, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Hattori, Keisuke, 2021. "Profit-Sharing vs Price-Fixing Collusion with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 110800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018.
"Quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 108-149.
- Vasconcelos, Helder & Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo, 2013. "Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Duarte Brito & Ricardo Ribeiro & Helder Vasconcelos, 2017. "Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 01, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
- Davide Dragone, 2007.
"Should One Sell Domestic Firms to Foreign Ones? A Tale of Delegation, Acquisition and Collusion,"
Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 97(3), pages 85-112, May-June.
- D. Dragone, 2008. "Should One Sell Domestic Firms to Foreign Ones? A Tale of Delegation, Acquisition and Collusion," Working Papers 623, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2018.
"Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 19-55, May.
- João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2017. "Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization," FEP Working Papers 590, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Carlo Capuano & Iacopo Grassi & Riccardo Martina, 2020.
"Patent protection and threat of litigation in oligopoly,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 109-131, July.
- Capuano, Carlo & Grassi, Iacopo, 2018. "Patent Protection and Threat of Litigation in Oligopoly," EconStor Preprints 175243, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Carlo Capuano & Iacopo Grassi & Riccardo Martina, 2019. "Patent Protection and Threat of Litigation in Oligopoly," CSEF Working Papers 537, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Carlo Capuano & Iacopo Grassi, 2018. "Patent Protection and Threat of Litigation in Oligopoly," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2018/03, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- Mariana Cunha & Filipa Mota, 2020. "Coordinated Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 617-641, December.
- Filomena Garcia & Jose Manuel Paz y Miño & Gustavo Torrens, 2020. "The merger paradox, collusion, and competition policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 2051-2081, December.
- Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2011. "Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 49-89, September.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007.
"Antitrust,"
Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225,
Elsevier.
- Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 12867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9pt7p9bm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2011.
"Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(1), pages 99-125, January.
- Jeanine Thal, 2005. "Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry," Working Papers 2005-36, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry," MPRA Paper 11044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Emilie, Dargaud, 2010. "Mergers, cartels and leniency programs: The role of capital stocks," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 45-57, March.
- Aitor Ciarreta & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2012. "Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(3), pages 195-219, July.
- Porter, Robert H., 2020. "Mergers and coordinated effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
- Persson, Lars & Ganslandt, Mattias & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2008. "Asymmetric Cartels - a Theory of Ring Leaders," CEPR Discussion Papers 6829, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2019. "On competition and welfare enhancing policies in a mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 126(3), pages 259-274, April.
- de Roos, Nicolas, 2004. "A model of collusion timing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 351-387, March.
- Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2021. "Coordinated Effects in Merger Review," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(4), pages 705-744.
- Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0295, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- de Roos, Nicolas, 2006. "Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1083-1107, November.
More about this item
Keywords
Collusion; Public firms; Mixed oligopoly; Nash bargaining;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:62:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-023-09903-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.