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Would Excess Capacity in Public Firms Be Socially Optimal?

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  • Mei Wen
  • Dan Sasaki

Abstract

We analyse oligopolistic interactions between a welfare‐maximizing public firm and a profit‐maximizing private firm in a repeated game. We find that the public firm can hold excess capacity as a strategic punishment device to sustain a subgame perfect equilibrium which is welfare‐superior to the static Nash equilibrium. Basically, potential punishment from the public firm in the dynamic game can make the self‐interested private firm behave in the public interest. Furthermore, if capacity is endogenous, public excess capacity can occur in a welfare efficient equilibrium when the cost of public capacity investment is higher than that of private investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Mei Wen & Dan Sasaki, 2001. "Would Excess Capacity in Public Firms Be Socially Optimal?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 77(238), pages 283-290, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:77:y:2001:i:238:p:283-290
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-4932.t01-1-00023
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    Cited by:

    1. Zheng, Shiyuan & Negenborn, Rudy R., 2014. "Centralization or decentralization: A comparative analysis of port regulation modes," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 21-40.
    2. Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2012. "Capacity choice in a mixed duopoly with a foreign competitor," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2653-2661.
    3. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2009. "Capacity Investment and Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 10(1), pages 49-64, May.
    4. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2014. "Capacity choice and welfare under alternative unionisation structures," Discussion Papers 2014/176, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    5. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, July.
    6. Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2018. "Government-leading welfare-improving collusion," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 363-370.
    7. Filipa Mota & João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2023. "Public–Private Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 62(4), pages 393-417, June.
    8. Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2019. "Capacity choice and optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2751-2765.
    9. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2012. "Undesirable competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 175-177.
    10. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2008. "International mixed duopoly and strategic commitments," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 421-432, February.
    11. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2013. "A Two-production-period Model with State-owned and Labour-managed Firms," Institutions and Economies (formerly known as International Journal of Institutions and Economies), Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, vol. 5(1), pages 41-56, April.
    12. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2022. "Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(1), pages 27-42, June.
    13. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2011. "A Quantity-Setting Mixed Duopoly with Inventory Investment as a Coordination Device," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 12(1), pages 109-119, May.
    14. Ishibashi, Ikuo & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2006. "R&D competition between public and private sectors," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1347-1366, August.

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