Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm Size
AbstractBarr and Saraceno (JEDC, forthcoming) model the firm as a type of artificial neural network (ANN) which plays a repeated Cournot game. Each period, the network/firm must estimate the relationship between environmental conditions and optimal output. Among other results, the paper develops the notion of a Network Size Equilibrium (NSE): which is an optimal network size for each of the players. The concept of NSE allows us to map environmental complexity to a type of industrial structure, i.e., the average network size in equilibrium. This paper builds on the previous work by exploring the dynamic adjustment process of networks. That is to say, we explore how the network (firm) evolves over time in reaction to the environmental complexity and the behavior of its rival. We model how firms endogenously "grow" over time in the adjustment process toward a network size equilibrium by exploring different adjustment algorithms, which may involve different costs. Further we explore the stability and the types of equilibria that can emerge, given different environmental scenarios.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 with number 129.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Cournot Competition; Neural Networks; Adjustment Dynamics;
Other versions of this item:
- Jason Barr & Francesco Saraceno, 2005. "Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm Size," Sciences Po publications 2005-001, Sciences Po.
- Jason Barr & Francesco Saraceno, 2005. "Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm Size," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2005-001, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-10-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2004-10-21 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2004-10-21 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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