This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm Size

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jason Barr ()
Francesco Saraceno ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study the dynamics of firm size in a repeated Cournot game with unkown demand function. We model the firm as a type of artificial neural network. Each period it must learn to map environmental signals to both demand parameters and its rival's output choice. But this learning game is in the background, and we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size. We investigate the long-run behavior of firm/network size as a function of profits, rival's size, and the type of adjustment rules used.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rutgers-newark.rutgers.edu/econnwk/workingpapers/2005-001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark in its series Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark with number 2005-001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:run:wpaper:2005-001

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 360 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd., Newark, NJ 07102
Phone: (973) 353-5259
Web page: http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~econnwk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jason Barr).

Related research
Keywords: Firm size; adjustment dynamics; artificial neural networks; Cournot games;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computational Techniques
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Evans, David S, 1987. "Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 657-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jason Barr & Francesco Saraceno, 2004. "Organization, Learning and Cooperation," Computational Economics 0402001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Martin Currie & Stan Metcalfe, 2001. "Firm routines, customer switching and market selection under duopoly," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 433-456. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Chang, Myong-Hun & Harrington, Joseph Jr., 2006. "Agent-Based Models of Organizations," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 1273-1337 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Nickell, Stephen J, 1996. "Competition and Corporate Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 724-46, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. DeCanio, Stephen J. & Watkins, William E., 1998. "Information processing and organizational structure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 275-294, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2005. "Cournot competition, organization and learning," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 277-295, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. William Novshek & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1982. "Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 214-218, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 649-70, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2002. "A computational theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 345-361, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.