We analyze a standard employee selection model given two institutional constraints: First, professional experience perfectly substitutes insufficient formal education for insiders while this substitution is imperfect for outsiders. Second, in the latter case the respective substitution rate increases with the advertised minimum educational requirement. Optimal selection implies that the expected level of formal education is higher for outsider than for insider recruits. Moreover, this difference in educational attainments increases with lower optimal minimum educational job requirements. Investigating data of a large US public employer confirms both of the above theoretical implications. Generally, the econometric model exhibits a good fit.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Chirok Han & Peter C. B. Phillips, 2006.
"GMM with Many Moment Conditions,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 147-192, 01.
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Arnaud Chevalier, 2003.
"Measuring Over-education,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(279), pages 509-531, 08.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)