Subject-specific Performance Information can worsen the Tragedy of the Commons: Experimental Evidence
AbstractThe main aim of this article is to investigate the behavioral consequences of the provision of subject-specific information in the group effort levels chosen by players in an experimental CPR game. We examine two basic treatments, one with incomplete information and the other with complete information. In the former, subjects are informed only about their own individual payoffs and the aggregate extraction effort level of the group, and in the latter they are also informed about the individual effort levels and payoffs of each subject. Given this setting, the basic question we attempt to answer is: Will the provision of subject-specific performance information (i.e. individual’s effort levels and payoffs) improve or worsen the tragedy of the commons (i.e. an exploitation effort level greater than the socially optimum level)? In order to motivate our hypotheses and explain our experimental results at the individual level, we make use of the theory of learning in games, which goes beyond standard non-cooperative game theory, allowing us to explore the three basic benchmarks in the commons context: Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficient, and open access outcomes. We use several learning and imitation theoretical models that are based on contrasting assumptions about the level of rationality and the information available to subjects, namely: best response, imitate the average, mix of best response and imitate the average, imitate the best and follow the exemplary learning rules. Finally, in order to econometrically test the hypotheses formulated from the theoretical predictions we use a random-effects model to assess the explanatory power of the different selected behavioral learning and imitation rules.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27783.
Date of creation: 09 Jan 2010
Date of revision: 02 Dec 2010
Common Property Resources; Information; Learning and Imitation; Experimental Economics.;
Other versions of this item:
- Villena, Mauricio G. & Zecchetto, Franco, 2011. "Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 330-347, June.
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-01-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-01-16 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-01-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-01-16 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-72, March.
- Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1997.
"Stability of the Cournot Process - Experimental Evidence,"
- Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2002. "Stability of the Cournot process - experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 123-136.
- Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2002. "Stability of the Cournot Process - Experimental Evidence," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse1_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas & John Stranlund & Cleve Willis, 2000.
"Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out,"
Artefactual Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website
00028, The Field Experiments Website.
- Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
- Rafael E. De Hoyos & Vasilis Sarafidis, 2006. "Testing for cross-sectional dependence in panel-data models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, StataCorp LP, vol. 6(4), pages 482-496, December.
- Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996.
"The evolution of walrasian behavior,"
Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones EconÃ³micas, S.A. (Ivie)
1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- David K Levine, 1997.
"Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2047, David K. Levine.
- César Salazar & Mauricio Villena, 2005. "Evolucion De Preferencias En Un Juego De Explotacion De Un Recurso De Propiedad Común: Evidencia Experimental," Working Papers, Departamento de EconomÃa, Universidad de ConcepciÃ³n 08-2005, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
- Schlag, Karl H., 1996.
"Which one should I imitate?,"
Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany
365, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2001.
"How do groups solve local commons dilemmas? Lessons from experimental economics in the field,"
Artefactual Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website
00018, The Field Experiments Website.
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2000. "How Do Groups Solve Local Commons Dilemmas? Lessons from Experimental Economics in the Field," Environment, Development and Sustainability, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 305-322, September.
- Walker, James M, et al, 2000. "Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 212-34, January.
- Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M. & Sonnemans, J., 2002.
"Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91663, Tilburg University.
- Offerman, Theo & Potters, Jan & Sonnemans, Joep, 2002. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 973-97, October.
- Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 2002. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 973-997.
- Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 1997. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-116/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1991. " Rules and Games," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 121-49, May.
- Hackett Steven & Schlager Edella & Walker James, 1994. "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 99-126, September.
- Mundlak, Yair, 1978. "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 69-85, January.
- Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999.
"Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March.
- Carlos Rodríguez-Sickert & Ricardo Andrés Guzmán & Juan Camilo Cárdenas, 2006.
"Institutions Influence Preferences: Evidence From A Common Pool Resource Experiment,"
DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE
002890, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Rodriguez-Sickert, Carlos & Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés & Cárdenas, Juan Camilo, 2008. "Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 215-227, July.
- Ostrom, Elinor, 2006. "The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 149-163, October.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
- Anders Skrondal & Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, 2007. "Latent Variable Modelling: A Survey," Scandinavian Journal of Statistics, Danish Society for Theoretical Statistics;Finnish Statistical Society;Norwegian Statistical Association;Swedish Statistical Association, vol. 34(4), pages 712-745.
- Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1998.
"Imitation of succesful behavior in Cournot markets,"
Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
269, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 1999.
- Antoni Bosch-DomËnech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2003. "Imitation of successful behaviour in cournot markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 495-524, 04.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
- Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
- Paul Seabright, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-134, Fall.
- Casari, Marco & Plott, Charles R., 2003. "Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 217-247, June.
- Pamela Schmitt & Kurtis Swope & James Walker, 2000. "Collective Action with Incomplete Commitment: Experimental Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 829-854, April.
- Anabela Botelho & Ariel Dinar & Lígia M.Costa Pinto & Amnon Rapoport, 2013. "Linking Appropriation of Common Resources and Provision of Public Goods Decreases Rate of Destruction of the Commons," NIMA Working Papers, NÃºcleo de InvestigaÃ§Ã£o em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho 50, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.