Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation
AbstractIn a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve usersâ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LERNA, University of Toulouse in its series LERNA Working Papers with number 09.18.294.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Ambec & Alexis Garapin & Laurent Muller & Arnaud Reynaud & Carine Sebi, 2014. "Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(2), pages 219-244, June.
- Ambec, S. & Garapin, A. & Muller, L. & Reynaud, A. & Sebi, C., 2013. "Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation," Working Papers 2013-07, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Ambec, Stefan & Garapin, Alexis & Muller, Laurent & Reynaud, Arnaud & Sebi, Carine, 2009. "Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation," TSE Working Papers 09-100, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
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