Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

Author Info

Walker, James M, et al

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

James Marvin Walker

Abstract

We analyse and empirically examine a multi-level common-pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective-choice level game and an operational-level game. In the collective-choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 110 (2000)
Issue (Month): 460 (January)
Pages: 212-34
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:460:p:212-34

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Camera, G. & Noussair, C. & Tucker, S., 2000. "Rate-of-Return Dominance and Efficiency in an Experimental Economy," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1135, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Gabriele Camera & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker, 2003. "Rate-of-return dominance and efficiency in an experimental economy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 629-660, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Elinor Ostrom, 2004. "The Working Parts of Rules and How They May Evolve Over Time," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2004-04, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
Runge, C. Ford, 2006. "Agricultural Economics: A Brief Intellectual History," Staff Papers 13649, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
Jose Apesteguia, 2001. "Does Information Matter? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse24_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Stefan Ambec & Alexis Garapin & Laurent Muller & Arnaud Reynaud & Carine Sebi, 2009. "Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation," Working Papers 09.18.294, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
Sadrieh, A. & Fischer, M.E. & Irlenbusch, B., 2003. "An intergenerational common pool resource experiment," Discussion Paper 57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fischer, Maria-Elisabeth & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2004. "An intergenerational common pool resource experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 811-836, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Research Memoranda 029, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IZA Discussion Papers 2288, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Discussion Papers 2006-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
- Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IEW - Working Papers iewwp299, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? A tutorial is available.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-8.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.