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To be or not to be in the euro? Benefits and costs of monetary unification as perceived by voters in the Swedish euro referendum 2003

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  • Jonung, Lars

Abstract

The Swedish referendum in September 2003 on adopting the euro or keeping the domestic currency, the krona, represents a unique event to examine the public’s perceptions of the benefits and costs of monetary unification. The voters chose between the two polar cases of exchange rate regimes: either a freely floating exchange rate or membership in a monetary union. Three major conclusions emerge from the analysis of the exit poll surveys gathered on the day of the referendum. First, the optimum currency area theory proves to be a constructive framework to predict voting behaviour across socio-economic groups and regions in Sweden, assuming voters behave in their self-interest. Second, the distribution of the expected benefits and costs across groups was a major determinant of their voting behavior. As predicted by theory, the Yes-vote was strongest among voters employed in the tradable sector, in high growth regions as well as among high-income earners and well educated. The No-vote was strongest among voters employed in the non-tradable sector, in particular in the public sector, and among low-income earners, the unemployed and the less educated – in short, among groups dependent on public-sector transfers to maintain their living standards in the event of adverse economic shocks. Third, political attitudes towards the European integration process heavily influenced the views of the voters towards the euro.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1334.

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Date of creation: 02 Jun 2004
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Publication status: Published in The Cato Journal numbers 1-2.24(2004): pp. 123-149
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1334

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Keywords: Euro; optimum currency area; exchange rate regime; voting; referendum; Sweden;

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  1. Orlagh Doyle & Jan Fidrmuc, 2005. "Who is in Favour of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for EU Membership in the Candidate's Countries Referenda," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp045, IIIS.
  2. M.J. Artis, 2003. "Reflections on the optimal currency area (OCA) criteria in the light of EMU," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(4), pages 297-307.
  3. Barry Eichengreen & Jeffry Frieden, 1993. "The Political Economy Of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 85-104, 07.
  4. Barry Eichengreen & David Leblang, 2003. "Exchange Rates and Cohesion: Historical Perspectives and Political-Economy Considerations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 797-822, December.
  5. Francesco Paolo Mongelli, 2002. "'New' views on the optimum currency area theory: what is EMU telling us?," Working Paper Series 138, European Central Bank.
  6. Vlachos, Jonas, 2004. "Who wants political integration?: Evidence from the Swedish EU-membership referendum," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1589-1604, July.
  7. Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2002. "Distributive consequences of a monetary union: what can we learn from a referendum?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8390, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  8. Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung, 1999. "The Future of EMU: What Does the History of Monetary Unions Tell Us?," NBER Working Papers 7365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Siklos, Pierre L., 2010. "Meeting Maastricht: Nominal convergence of the new member states toward EMU," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 507-515, March.

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