Effet de discipline et effet de crédibilité de l’ancrage nominal
Abstract
[fre] La fIXité nominale impose certaines contraintes pour être viable. Les unions de taux de change de type caisses d'émission et Zone franc garantissent la pérennité de l'ancrage. Elles maximisent ainsi [' effet de la ftxité nominale en contraignant la politique monétaire. Les effets attendus de l'ancrage sur l'inflation SOnt : un effet de crédibilité provenant d'un ancrage durable ; un effet de discipline reposant sur les contraintes imposées à la politique monétaire pour la survie du régime. La procédure économétrique distingue les effets de discipline et les effets de crédibilité des unions de taux de change dans une équation explicative de l'inflation. Les principaux résultats sont la prédominance de l'effet de discipline pour les caisses d'émission et de l'effet de crédibilité pour la Zone franc. . ClassificationfEL : C22, C23, E51, E52, F31, F32, F33 . . . [eng] This article presents sorne econometric tests. The first specification sizes the total effect on inflation. The second specification adds base money supply in order to size discipline effects. The remainder effect is supposed to be a pure credibility effect. Both regimes have a low inflation bias relying more on discipline effects for CBA and on long lasting fixity for the Franc Zone. . lEI classification : C22, C23, E51, E52, F31, F32, F33 . . .Download Info
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.
Volume (Year): 75 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 55-69
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecofi
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