Provincial Interests and Political Integration: Voting in the French Maastricht Referendum
AbstractIn September 1992 French voters in a national referendum approved the Maastrict Treaty, which instituted several provisions for closer European integration including creation of the Eurozone. This paper analyzes political and economic forces that affected French voters, and the links between the progress of European integration and changes in redistributive spending. Conventional wisdom ascribes the persistence of the Common Agricultural Program subsidies to the political power of farmers, although direct evidence of this has been sparse. The statistical analysis here finds that support for European integration is weaker, other things equal, in areas where farmers were most affected by the MacSharry reforms, which reduced some support prices and began the process of `decoupling' agricultural subsidies from production. Results also show previous support for European integration and pro-European politicians are correlated with stronger support for ratification, as are higher incomes and higher proportions of non-natives. The results are consistent with the view that European integration provides voters and taxpayers with a way to limit the influence of interest groups by shifting decisionmaking from a national to a supranational arena.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp281.
Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Referendum; agricultural subsidies; European integration; voting.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-12-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EEC-2005-12-20 (European Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-12-20 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-12-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas Piketty, 2003. "Income Inequality in France, 1901-1998," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1004-1042, October.
- Vlachos, Jonas, 2003.
"Who Wants Political Integration? Evidence from the Swedish EU-Membership Referendum,"
Working Paper Series
594, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Vlachos, Jonas, 2004. "Who wants political integration?: Evidence from the Swedish EU-membership referendum," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1589-1604, July.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2002.
"Distributive consequences of a monetary union: what can we learn from a referendum?,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/8390, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre-Guillaume Meon, 2002. "Distributive consequences of a monetary union: what can we learn from a referendum?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 9(9), pages 581-584.
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