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Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications

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  • Behringer, Stefan

Abstract

This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11795.

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Date of creation: 27 Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11795

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Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric Networks; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Competition Policy; Telecommunications;

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References

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  1. Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001. "Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
  2. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May.
  3. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Vuong, 2012. "Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 204-222, October.
  4. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers, JEPS 05-002, JEPS.
  5. Armstrong, Mark & Wright, Julian, 2007. "Mobile call termination in the UK," MPRA Paper 2344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Hoernig, Steffen, 2006. "On-Net and Off-Net Pricing on Asymmetric Telecommunications Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Wouter Dessein, 2000. "Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) FS IV 00-22, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  8. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Behringer, Stefan, 2009. "Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 185-188, March.
  10. Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination Revisited," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 10-198, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2010.
  11. Geoffron, Patrice & Benzoni, Laurent, 2007. "Competition and regulation with asymmetries in mobile markets," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/11246, Paris Dauphine University.
  12. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
  13. Ralf Dewenter & Justus Haucap, 2005. "The Effects of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates for Asymmetric Networks," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 185-197, September.
  14. Patrice Geoffron & Haobo Wang, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 58-79.
  15. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages F270-F307, 06.
  16. Geoffron, Patrice & Wang, Haobo, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/79, Paris Dauphine University.
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Cited by:
  1. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry," JEPS Working Papers, JEPS 05-003, JEPS.

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