Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications
AbstractThis paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11795.
Date of creation: 27 Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Asymmetric Networks; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Competition Policy; Telecommunications;
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
- Stefan Behringer, 2006. "Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications," JEPS Working Papers 06-005, JEPS.
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-12-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ICT-2008-12-01 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-LAW-2008-12-01 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2008-12-01 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2008-12-01 (Network Economics)
- NEP-REG-2008-12-01 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-003, JEPS.
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