Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Patrice Geoffron
  • Haobo Wang
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The aim of our paper is to determine the efficiency of the asymmetric regulation of the Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs) in a market where the firms are differentiated in size and with commercial offers that include calling club effects. Major regulatory issues are related to these analyses, since some European National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and the European Commission tend to question asymmetric regulation mechanisms. Based on a model designed to determine firm profits and consumer surplus, our main results are as follows: the asymmetric regulation of the MTRs may contribute to an increase in welfare. If the impact is neutral regarding the firms (a simple reallocation of profits from the large to the small player), the consumer surplus is increased; the appropriate way to proceed is to decrease the large firm's MTRs rather than increasing the smaller firm's ones, which could produce negative side effects; from a dynamic point of view, the appropriate asymmetric regulation may contribute to balancing market shares and, in such a way, compensate for first-mover advantages.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=18680
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Inderscience Enterprises Ltd in its journal Int. J. of Management and Network Economics.

    Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 58-79

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ids:ijmnec:v:1:y:2008:i:1:p:58-79

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID==259

    Related research

    Keywords: telecommunications; asymmetric regulation; mobile termination rates; MTR; networks; calling club effects; size differentiation; firm profits; consumer surplus; network economics; welfare increase.;

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Stefan Behringer, 2006. "Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications," JEPS Working Papers, JEPS 06-005, JEPS.
    2. Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Stühmeier, Torben, 2010. "Wettbewerb im deutschen Mobilfunkmarkt," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 04, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:ijmnec:v:1:y:2008:i:1:p:58-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Graham Langley).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.