Mobile call termination in the UK
AbstractWe discuss policy towards mobile call termination, illustrated by the 2002 Competition Commission enquiry into the UK mobile market. We present a model of the mobile market which includes both fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile call termination. In broad terms, the former service is likely to involve monopoly pricing if left unchecked, while the latter service---if the termination charge is jointly chosen by networks---may provide the mobile sector with the means by which to relax competition. Competition is often relaxed by choosing a low mobile-to-mobile termination charge. If feasible, then, unregulated networks often wish to set different termination charges depending on whether traffic originates on the fixed or mobile network. By contrast, social optimality often requires that uniform termination charges be imposed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2344.
Date of creation: 21 Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Telecommunications; Regulation; Oligopoly; Call termination;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-03-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2007-03-24 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2007-03-24 (Network Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-03-24 (Regulation)
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