This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Stefan Behringer () (Economics Department, Frankfurt University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper looks at the effects of entry on welfare in the telecommunication industry. The equilibrium pricing parameters for an incumbent (state) monopoly and for a duopoly situation are determined in which access charges are chosen non-reciprocally. A welfare comparison between the monopoly and duopoly equilibrium situation is undertaken and the welfare consequences of alternative access pricing regimes are investigated.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by JEPS in its series JEPS Working Papers with number 05-003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:05003

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://jeps.repec.org/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Gall).

Related research
Keywords: Telecommunications; access pricing;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network Interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-002, JEPS.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stefan Behringer, 2006. "Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications," JEPS Working Papers 06-005, JEPS.
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.