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Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Johan Stennek () (Gothenburg University )
Thomas TangerŒs (Research Institute of Industrial Economics )
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome may prevail independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A lighthanded regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability.
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Paper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number
08-09.
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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008Date of revision:
Sep 2008Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0809Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nicholas Economides).
Keywords: network competition ; two-way access ; mobile termination rates ; entry ; collusion ; Find related papers by JEL classification: L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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