Price squeezes in a regulatory environment
AbstractRegulators have recently shown an increased sensitivity to the issue of price squeezes, especially telecom regulators in European countries. This paper analyzes the relevance and the scope of price squeeze tests as proposed by practitioners and economists, taking the existing regulatory environment as fixed. Based on the degree of existing regulation (full, partial or no) we distinguish between three types of price squeezes: regulatory squeezes, predatory squeezes, and squeezes as foreclosure. We argue that the scope of price squeeze tests is limited to predatory price squeeze tests, to be used in combination with other pieces of evidence as collected in standard predation cases. We propose a predatory squeeze test that respects previously made regulatory choices, in contrast with earlier proposed tests by European practitioners and economists. We extend the framework to ask at which aggregation level predatory price squeeze tests ought to be applied, a much-debated issue in telecommunications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003007.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Bouckaert, Jan & Verboven, Frank, 2003. "Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bouckaert, B & Verboven, Frank, 2003. "Price squeezes in a regulatory environment," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/118284, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-01-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EEC-2005-01-02 (European Economics)
- NEP-EEC-2005-01-05 (European Economics)
- NEP-IND-2005-01-02 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2005-01-02 (Regulation)
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