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La tariffazione dell'accesso nelle telecomunicazioni: principi economici e interventi regolatori in alcuni paesi industrializzati

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Author Info
Carlo Cambini ()
Piercarlo Ravazzi ()
Tommaso Valletti ()

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Abstract

La presenza di un'impresa monopolista che controlla un input rilevante per altre imprese esclude la possibilità di lasciare alle sole forze di mercato la determinazione del suo prez-zo: l'alta probabilità di abusi da parte dell'impresa dominante, di possibili comportamenti predatori o di forme di chiusura dell'accesso impongono un intervento volto a regolarne il prezzo e ad impedire comportamenti anticompetitivi del proprietario della rete. Il proble-ma della regolamentazione del prezzo di interconnessione, sia tra reti fisse che tra reti fis-se e mobili, nasce dunque dall'esistenza di attività potenzialmente concorrenziali, la cui realizzazione dipende dalla possibilità di accesso a una attrezzatura essenziale (essential facility). Dopo una breve descrizione dei principali risultati teorici sulla regolamentazione dei prezzi di accesso, l'obiettivo del lavoro è quello di effettuare una sintesi critica dei principali metodi utilizzati nella pratica alla luce delle più recenti esperienze della Gran Bretagna, degli USA e dell'UE.

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Paper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 10-2000.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2000
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Handle: RePEc:icr:wpicer:10-2000

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  1. Harris, Robert G & Kraft, C Jeffrey, 1997. "Meddling Through: Regulating Local Telephone Competition in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 93-112, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509.
  4. Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C., 1994. "Access Pricing, Entry and the Baumol-Willig Rule," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9422, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  5. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1997. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Industrial Organization 9701003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  8. Baumol, W, & Ordover, J. & Willig, R., 1996. "Parity Pricing and Its Critics: Necessary Condition for Efficiency in Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors," Working Papers 96-33, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2), pages 131-50, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790.
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

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