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Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications

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Author Info
Bourreau, Marc
Hombert, Johan
Pouyet, Jérôme
Schutz, Nicolas

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Abstract

In telecommunications some operators have deployed their own networks whereas some others have not. The latter firms must purchase wholesale products from the former to be able to compete on the final market. We show that, even when network operators compete in prices and offer perfectly homogenous products on the wholesale market, that market may not be competitive. Based on our theoretical analysis, we derive some policy implications for the broadband and the mobile telephony markets.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6224.

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Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6224

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Related research
Keywords: telecommunications; upstream and downstream markets; vertical integration;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Duarte Brito & Pedro Pereira, 2006. "Access to Bottleneck Inputs under Oligopoly: a Prisoners Dilemma?," Working Papers 16, Portuguese Competition Authority. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Foros, Oystein, 2004. "Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-24, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1996. "Strategic Nonparticipation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 84-98, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michiel Bijlsma & Viktória Kocsis & Nelli Valmari, 2008. "Competition and access price regulation in the broadband market," CPB Discussion Papers 106, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Victoria Shestalova & Gijsbert Zwart, 2008. "Vertical foreclosure, a policy framework," CPB Documents 157, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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