Ex-ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications industry: What is a reasonable efficient operator? (Revised: December 20, 2012)
AbstractWe study the implementation of reasonably efficient operator margin squeeze tests by National Regulatory Authorities in European telecommunications markets. We provide a theoretical framework in which we show how regulatory authorities deal with the asymmetries between the entrants and the incumbent by adjusting the equally efficient operator margin squeeze test used in competition policy. Using this framework, we build a benchmark of implementation choices by inspecting authorities' guidelines, market analyses and decisions. We find that some implementation choices are very similar across the authorities' decisions, whereas some others are dealt with quite heterogeneously. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Telecommunications Society (ITS) in its series 23rd European Regional ITS Conference, Vienna 2012 with number 67955.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.itseurope.org/
Margin squeeze; Imputation test; Regulation; Telecommunications;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-01-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-REG-2013-01-26 (Regulation)
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