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The theory of access pricing and interconnection

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Author Info
Armstrong, Mark

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Abstract

This paper surveys the theory of access pricing and interconnection in telecommunicatons. One-way access pricing, competition bottlenects and two-way access pricing are discussed.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15608/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15608.

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Date of creation: May 2001
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15608

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Related research
Keywords: Telecommunications; access pricing; network interconnection; ECPR;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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  1. Lee, Sang Hyup & Hamilton, Jonathan H, 1999. "Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 223-48, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2000. "Mobile network competition, customer ignorance and fixed-to-mobile call prices," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 301-327, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gans, Joshua S, 2001. "Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing for Access to Essential Facilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 167-89, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993. "Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 335-59, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. De Fraja, Gianni, 1999. "Regulation and access pricing with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 109-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  8. Sibley, David S. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1998. "Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 451-470, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Lim, Yoonsung, 2001. "An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 231-260, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Vickers, John, 1995. "Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(1), pages 1-17, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2), pages 131-50, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2004. "On the Receiver-Pays Principle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 85-110, Spring.
    Other versions:
  14. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1998. "The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(1), pages 115-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gary Biglaiser & Michael Riordan, 2000. "Dynamics of Price Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 744-767, Winter.
  16. Bijl, P.W.J. de & Peitz, M., 2004. "Dynamic regulation and entry in telecommunications markets : a policy framework," Discussion Paper 010, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Working Papers 95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Little, Iain & Wright, Julian, 2000. "Peering and Settlement in the Internet: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 151-73, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
  21. Domon, Koji & Kiyono, Kazuharu, 1999. "A Voluntary Subsidy Scheme for the Accounting Rate System in International Telecommunications Industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 151-65, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1998. "Efficient Entry, Monopoly, and the Universal Service Obligation in Postal Service," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 103-25, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Hakim, Sam Ramsey & Lu, Ding, 1993. "Monopolistic settlement agreements in international telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 145-157, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Dessein, Wouter, 2003. " Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 593-611, Winter.
  25. Gans, Joshua S & Williams, Philip L, 1999. "Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 75(229), pages 127-37, June.
  26. Vickers, John, 1997. "Regulation, Competition, and the Structure of Prices," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 15-26, Spring.
  27. Vickers, John, 1996. "Market Power and Inefficiency: A Contracts Perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 11-26, Winter.
  28. Cave, Martin & Donnelly, Mark P., 1996. "The pricing of international telecommunications services by monopoly operators," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 107-123, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2004. "Network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 611-631, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  30. Wright, Julian, 1999. "International Telecommunications, Settlement Rates, and the FCC," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 267-91, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Dr. Peter Kenning & Hilke Plassmann, 2004. "NeuroEconomics," Experimental 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  32. Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-66, November.
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