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Verdrängungspreise an Tankstellen?

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Kleineberg

    (Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany)

  • Thomas Wein

    (Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany)

Abstract

Das Wettbewerbsrecht unterschiedlicher Länder kennt vielfältige Tatbestandsmerkmale. Ein sehr umstrittener Tatbestand ist die Margin-Squeeze-Preissetzung (MSP) oder das Setzen negativer Margen. Um den Wettbewerb auf dem Kraftstoffmarkt zu erhöhen hat der deutsche Gesetzgeber das Setzen negativer Margen als Tatbestand in das Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) aufgenommen. In Folge dessen begann eine umfangreiche Diskussion zu den vermeintlichen Preissetzungsproblemen auf dem deutschen Kraftstoffmarkt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Preissetzungsstrategien der Kraftstoffunternehmen, Konzerne wie auch das der unabhängigen Tankstellen. Der vorliegende Beitrag ist einer der wenigen, die das Auftreten von Margin-Squeeze-Fällen empirisch testet. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Margin-Squeeze-Preissetzung keine Strategie ist, die von Wettbewerbern auf dem deutschen Kraftstoffmarkt genutzt wird. Darüber hinaus zeigt der vorliegende Beitrag, dass das fehlende MSP-Verhalten nicht nur die Folge von gesetzestreuem Verhalten der Unternehmen ist und diese auch die enge Definition des deutschen Gesetzgebers nicht umgehen, indem sie niedrige Margen setzen, die es für kleinere Unternehmen nicht profitabel machen, auf dem Markt aktiv zu bleiben. Vielmehr lässt sich MSP empirisch nicht nachweisen, sodass keine gesetzliche Regelung notwendig ist.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Kleineberg & Thomas Wein, 2017. "Verdrängungspreise an Tankstellen?," Working Paper Series in Economics 375, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lue:wpaper:375
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christoph Kleineberg & Thomas Wein, 2015. "Relevance and Detection Problems of Margin Squeeze – The Case of German Gasoline Prices," Working Paper Series in Economics 355, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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