Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment
AbstractThis paper analyzes the relevance and the scope of price squeeze tests in a regulatory environment. We distinguish between three types of ex ante regulation (full, partial or no regulation) to identify regulatory squeezes, predatory squeezes, and squeezes as foreclosure. We argue that policy makers should (i) use price squeeze tests as an ex post instrument, compatible with the ex ante regulatory environment, and (ii) focus on predatory price squeezes. We propose a predatory squeeze test that respects regulatory choices that have been made previously, in contrast with the earlier proposed tests. We extend our framework to ask at which aggregation level predatory price squeeze tests ought to be applied, a much-debated issue in telecommunications. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 26 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
regulation; competition policy; utilities;
Other versions of this item:
- BOUCKAERT, Jan & VERBOVEN, Frank, 2003. "Price squeezes in a regulatory environment," Working Papers 2003007, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Bouckaert, Jan & Verboven, Frank, 2003. "Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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